G.R. No. 76872 – WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner, vs. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.
Facts
In 1979, Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa and sentenced to prison until November 2000. In April, same year, he was granted conditional pardon by the President, on the condition that he will not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. The petitioner accepted and released. Over the last twenty years, his record showed that various charges has been brought against him for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of BP Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions). In 1982, he was charged with 20 counts of estafa. In 1985, he was convicted of sedition. In 1986, the respondent recommended the cancellation of petitioner’s pardon. The President cancelled and he was recommitted to prison. Petitioner is questioning the order, thus this petition
Issue
Is conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence?
Ruling and Discussion
No. Conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
As provided under Art. VII, Sec. 19, except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. x x x
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowered the Governor-General to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.
Under Art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
Under our case laws, in relation to our existing laws, the following can be held:
- The grant of pardon as well as the determination of its terms and conditions is a purely executive act not subject to judicial scrutiny.
- There are two options in determining whether the conditions of a pardon have been breached as well as the consequences for the same. It may be: (a) a purely executive act under Section 64 (i) of the RAC; (b) a judicial act under Art. 159 of the RPC. The President has the prerogative to choose the option, when he chose to proceed under Sec. 64(i) of the RAC no judicial pronouncement of guilt or final judgment is required to recommend cancellation of the convict’s pardon.
- There is no deprivation of due process when Sec 64(i) is opted. The convict already had his day in court at the trial of his first offense for which he has been conditionally pardoned.
Jurisprudence holds that final judgment of a subsequent crime is not necessary to determine if the conditions of the pardon has been violated.
- Tesoro vs. Director of Prison. The determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro’s parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General [Executive] and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. By accepting the conditional parole, the accused, in effect agreed that the Gov Gen’s determination whether he has breached the conditions of the pardon (rather than that of ordinary courts) are binding upon him.
- Sales vs. Director of Prisons. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. They could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other. Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due process. The petitioner was a convict who had already been seized in a constitutional was been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor, he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The acceptance of pardon by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. It being an exercise of the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative.
Dispositive
Petition dismissed.