G.R. No. 211269 – RUBEN E. TIU, petitioner, vs. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Acting Chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Parole, HON. FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, Director of the Bureau of Corrections, HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA of the Department of Justice, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., the Executive Secretary, respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts
Tiu was detained at the Sablayan Prison and Penal Farm in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, having been found guilty of drug trafficking (shabu) in 2000. His conviction became final in 2004. On March 24, 2009, the Board of Pardons and Parole issued a resolution recommending the grant of executive clemency to petitioner. On June 3, 2010, acting on said recommendation, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) granted him conditional pardon without parole conditions but was, nonetheless, still subject to the conditions indicated in the individual pardon papers. No such papers were issued in petitioner’s favor. Petitioner requested for issuance of pardon certificate in his favor but denied. It turned out that PGMA did not sign his Pardon certificate, and that the related documents were returned to BPP, and the latter decided to defer actions pertaining to the pardon pending compliance with all the basic requirements for executive clemency. During the regime of President Aquino, RA No. 10592 was passed which would substantially increase the Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) of qualified inmates.
Petitioners argued that:
- Pursuant to R.A. No. 10592, he is entitled to 19 years and 7 months of GCTA, which when tacked with his actual time served of 14 years and 9 months would add up to 34 years and 4 months. Such is in excess of his allegedly reduced sentence of 30 years.
- R.A. No. 10592 shall be applied retroactively to being favorable to him. Section 5 thereof provides that time allowances for good conduct once granted shall not be revoked.
- His claim that his sentence was automatically reduced to 30 years upon being granted a colonist status pursuant to Section 7(b), Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the Bureau of Corrections Operating Manual (BuCor-OM). And that such status does not require executive approval pursuant to Sections 5 and 7 of the same Manual.
Issue
Should a writ of habeas corpus be granted to the petitioner?
Ruling and Discussion
No. The writ of habeas corpus should not be granted to the petitioner.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. In the present case, there is no showing that his detention has become unlawful.
The grant of executive clemency to him is incomplete and ineffective given that no individual pardon papers were issued in petitioner’s favor. Pardon is essentially a contract between the convict and the President. By virtue of which the convict agrees that he will be recommitted to prison should he violate the terms of his pardon. The determination of whether there has been a violations lies with the President, the Court cannot interfere. The terms and conditions of this contract were contained in the pardon papers, it is thus essential to the grant. This is not to say, however, that petitioner’s pardon papers may not have been issued due to non-compliance with the requirements, which is a matter that the Court shall not, and could not, resolve here. This is because the grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The conferment by the Director of Corrections of a colonist status to petitioner did not operate to reduce the latter’s sentence. The act of classification as a penal colonist or trustee is separate from and necessarily precedes the act of approval by the Executive. Once classified as such, the prisoner must maintain the classification, and such classification receives the President’s approval. Such approval is necessary. The reduction of a prisoner’s sentence is a partial pardon, and our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend the same.
Pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential.
Dispositive position
Petition dismissed.