G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039, L-34265, L-34339.
CONCEPCION, C.J.
Facts
On 9:00pm of August 21, 1971, the Liberal Party of the Philippines held a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971. Two hand grenades were thrown in the platform where the candidates and other persons were. 8 persons were killed on the incident, with several others seriously injured.
In relation to the Plaza Miranda Bombing incident, on noontime of August 23, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889.
The Proclamation declared the presence of lawless elements in the country and thus the existence of the state of lawlessness affecting public safety. Thus, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended for current and subsequent detainees for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion.
The petitioners were among those arrested and detained without warrant of arrest on reasonable belief that they had participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion.
On August 30, Proclamation No. 889-A was issued amending the previous Proclamation:
- adverting to the existence of an actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government; and
- asserting that the lawless elements are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion to accomplish their purpose.
Proclamation No. 889-A, then rendered the petitioners’ contentions moot and academic. Some of the petitioners’ cases were heard and the suspension of the writ were lifted in some areas. The Court held a close-door meeting with the respondents’ and petitioners’ attorneys, and other ranking AFP officials.
The petitioners are assailing the validity of said Proclamation for not being in compliance with Constitutional requirements insofar as:
- it did not declare the existence of actual invasion; insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and
- the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms.
The Constitutional bases of the contentions were:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. [Const., Art. III, Sec. 1(14)]
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. [Const., Art. VII, Sec. 10(2)]
Issue
- Was the determination of the existence of exigencies (factual basis) that warrant the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus belong exclusively to the President?
- Are the conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ present? Is there an invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof?
- Are the conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ present? Does public safety require the suspension of the privilege?
- What is the nature of the Court’s function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended?
- Do petitioners belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended?
Ruling and Discussion
- No. The determination of the existence of exigencies (factual basis) that warrant the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus does not belong exclusively to the President.
Under Art. VII, Sec. 10, par. 2. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, and (b) public safety must require the suspension of the privilege.
The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . . .” It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion — or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, imminent danger thereof — when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
While the Constitution guarantees the freedom of people, it should be exercised within the framework of social order established by the Constitution. When individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence — such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion — liberty may be withdraws, though limited, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it.
The Court abandoned its ruling on Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda and declared that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ after hearing the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken.
Barcelon v. Baker as a precedent was diluted by the following factors (The ruling in Montenegro was based on Barcelon so basically the same argument): first, it depends on the case of Martin v. Mott which pertains to the President’s power to call to call out the militia to suppress lawless violence. A power broader than the power to suspend the writ as it can be made despite the absence of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof; second, the privilege was suspended by the Governor-general, a representative of the sovereign. Such is not equivalent with the President’s exercise of his power, the latter dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all government authority emanates. - Yes. The conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ are present. There an invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof.
The contention that the size of NPA is too small compared to AFP is irrelevant since from the Constitution’s perspective, the existence of rebellion need not be widespread or of the magnitude of the civil war.
Jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila. All Communists believes that their goals can be achieved only through violence. There exists a New People’s Army antagonistic to the AFP which is per se a proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. - Yes. The conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ are present. Public safety requires the suspension of the privilege.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
On the petitioners’ contention that there is no rebellion, the Court said that the existence of a rebellion is obvious. See substantive issue [2].
On the petitioners’ contention that prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts, the Court said that the conditions were such that courts of justice no longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners’ reliance upon American cases is probably misplaced as these cases pertain to conviction by military courts of members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. Which is manifestly illegal if civil courts are properly functioning.
On the petitioners’ contention that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971, the Court said that it may have been due precisely to the suspension of the privilege.
On the petitioners’ contention that the President’s alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified, the Court said that in light of the demonstrations in 1970 and 1971, it would have been highly imprudent for the President to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale, under the July-August Plan.
On the petitioners’ contention that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court said that this is based on the assumption that the AFP has no other task than to fight the NPA, and that the latter is the only threat — and a minor one — to our security. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous.
The narration of factual circumstances support the conclusion that public safety indeed requires the issuance of the writ. There are also intels the NPA can make explosives from locally available materials. The President, in possession of these data and upon proper consultation could not have acted arbitrarily. Granting that he should not have suspended the writ all over the country, the justification is that he has to be given time to see how the rebellion work, and indeed, the suspension for some parts of the country was gradually lifted. Further, the suspension is limited for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, not a general one, which the President could as easily have issued. - In passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended, the court determines if there has been grave abuse of discretion.
The function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. The Court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative finding; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken.
The proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness. - Yes. Petitioners belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended.
Some of the petitioners were already permanently or temporarily released rendering their petitions moot and academic. Of those still detained, the Court found that their charges constitute rebellion and subversion both of which are covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. The crimes for which the detained petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Thus their continued detention is justified.
Instead of the Supreme Court or its commissioner taking the evidence, it is best to let preliminary examination be completed, so that petitioners’ release could be ordered by the CFI, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a probable cause be established against them.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
- Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
- Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;
- The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and
- Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.
- Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.