G.R. No. 87636 – NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, JOSE D. LINA, JR., JOHN OSMEÑA, VICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE A. SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, MAMINTAL ABDUL J. TAMANO, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JOSEPH ESTRADA, SOTERO LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., SANTANINA RASUL, VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME, HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, HON. FULGENCIO FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES QUISUMBING, HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON. ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE CONCEPCION, HON. LUIS SANTOS, HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, HON. RAINERIO REYES, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM and HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts
[Note: Authority of the President to submit a budget to the Congress as basis for the GAB is found in VII(22)]
GAB of 1989; signed into law as RA No. 6688
The President vetoed: a) 7 special provisions and b) Sec. 55, a general provision.
Sec. 55 reads. No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress… which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act.
Reason for veto. The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
GAB of 1989; signed into law as RA No. 6831
The President vetoing Sec. 16, a general provision.
Sec. 16 reads. Use of Savings. — The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION… [same provision as Sec. 55 of the GAB of 1989]
Reason for veto. Same reason for vetoing Sec. 55 of the GAB of 1989 with additional reference to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government.
Petitioners question the validity of the veto as:
- The line-veto power of the President in appropriations bill pertain to items, not provisions;
- The President cannot veto a provision of an appropriations bill without vetoing the whole bill;
- The line-veto power does not authorize the President to strike out restrictions or conditions as it will be tantamount to legislation in transgression of the doctrine of separation of powers;
- The power of augmentation has to be provided by law, thus the Congress may impose restrictions upon it as it deems necessary.
Issues
- Is there an actual case or controversy?
- Do petitioners have locus standi?
- Is the matter a political question?
- Does the President have the power to veto provisions (vis-à-vis items) in an appropriations bill?
- Are the assailed provisions appropriate?
- Are the conditions/restrictions provided by Congress appropriate?
- Does the President (and other officials mentioned in Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI) have the power to augment from savings granted that it must be made by law?
- Is the doctrine of separation of powers endangered by said augmentation?
- Did the President properly veto the assailed sections?
- Do the enactments of Sec. 55 (1989) and Sec. 16 of questioned GAAs operate as an implied repeal of PD No. 1177?
- Did the Congress undertake the proper remedy in this case?
Ruling and Discussion
- Yes, there an actual case or controversy.
There is an actual controversy between the Senate and the Executive department, the former in maintaining the charge of unconstitutionality of the President’s veto of said provisions. There is also a need for definitive ruling. The reiteration of the assailed provisions in the GAB of 1989 and GAB of 1990 underscores the need for judicial determination for the guidance of the departments.
Where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. - Yes, petitioners have legal standing.
As taxpayers. The Court enjoys discretion in entertaining suits brought by taxpayers. As Senate members. They have the requisite personality to raise questions of Constitutionality. - No. The matter is not a political question.
The Court will settle controversies otherwise political to delimit constitutional boundaries in accordance with the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution. - Yes. The President has the power to veto provisions (vis-à-vis items) in an appropriations bill.
Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. (analogous to the elimination of the service contract provision in La Bugal).
Comparing paragraphs 1 and 2 of Sec. 27 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: (a) Par. 1 refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule; (b) Par. 2 is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.
The veto under par. 2 pertains to an item, the President cannot veto a portion of an item and approve the rest. An item in an appropriation bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. - No. The assailed provisions are not appropriate.
The assailed provisions are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. They are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power. First, they do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation as they generally apply to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Bill. Second, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. One has to resort the original budget submitted by the President to find them. And some may not even appear on the face of the Bill as they have been eliminated. Last, they are expressions of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation.
Any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. - No. The conditions/restrictions provided by Congress are not appropriate.
The criteria set in the questioned GABs are inappropriate conditions. They are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. A general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill.
A settled rule is that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. - Yes. The President (and other officials mentioned in Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI) has the power to augment from savings granted that it must be made by law.
The statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the executive department in the General Appropriations Act from savings was specifically provided in existing laws: (a) PD No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 (as amended), Sec. 44; and (b) GAA of 1989, Sec. 12.
The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. - No. The doctrine of separation of powers is not endangered by said augmentation.
The transfer is made within a department (branch), and not from one department (branch) to another. - Yes. The President properly vetoed the assailed sections.
These provisions nullify the constitutional authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. - No. The enactments of Sec. 55 (1989) and Sec. 16 of questioned GAAs do not operate as an implied repeal of PD No. 1177.
Implied repeals are not favored. If it is indeed a repeal, all the more reason that they should be in a separate enactment, not in an appropriations bill. PD No. 1177 likewise is not repealed by the 1987 Constitution. The transitory provisions provided for the continuance of laws, decrees, etc., until repealed, amended or revoked. - No. The Congress did not undertake the proper remedy in this case.
A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.